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MICHAEL L. PERLIN* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
I am a child of the 60s.  This is no surprise to anyone who has talked to 
me for more than five minutes or who has read any of my writings about Bob 
Dylan.  But it is much more than musical nostalgia.  I was involved, serious-
ly involved, in the anti-war movement in college and in law school (my 
friends even know about the late night visit from FBI agents urging me to 
change the tone of anti-war editorials I had been writing when I was editor of 
the Rutgers Daily Targum in 1965–1966).1  After I passed the written bar 
examination, it took me over a year to be admitted to practice in New Jersey, 
  
 * Director, International Mental Disability Law Reform Project; Director, Online Men-
tal Disability Law Program; New York Law School, 185 West Broadway, New York, NY 
10013; 212-431-2183; mperlin@nyls.edu. 
 1. This followed a widely-covered university “teach-in” at which Rutgers Professor 
Eugene Genovese stated, “‘I do not fear or regret the impending Vietcong victory in Vietnam.  
I welcome it.’”  Douglas Martin, Eugene D. Genovese, 82, Historian of South, Dies, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 30, 2012, at A36.  My editorials cited Voltaire in the defense of his right to free 
speech. 
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as members of the “character and fitness committee” in my home county had 
questions about anti-war petitions I had signed when I was a law student (I 
solved the problem by moving to a new county).  But during all that time, I 
never “got” the enmity that so many of my contemporaries leveled at those 
who were serving in the Army (many of whom, of course, were doing so 
involuntarily).  Truth be known, at all the marches, rallies, and demonstra-
tions I attended, I never once heard the “baby killer” phrase that was alleged-
ly a common cry at that time (I expect that, like the bra-burning that never 
took place, it simply served as a rallying symbol).  But, it was always clear to 
me that, once Vietnam veterans returned home, the transition to civilian soci-
ety was not an easy one. 
The Vietnam War ended in 1975.  A year prior to that, the State of New 
Jersey created a new office, the Department of the Public Advocate,2 to pro-
vide legal representation to those who had been ignored by the justice sys-
tem, a “voice for the voiceless.”3  As part of this department, a Division of 
Mental Health Advocacy was created,4 and at the embarrassingly-young age 
of twenty eight, I became the first director of that division.  We represented 
persons in individual matters in civil commitment cases, post-insanity acquit-
tal release hearings, refusal of treatment cases, and the full range of law re-
form and test case litigation that challenged the way patients were treated in 
state hospitals and in community settings.5 
  
 2. See  George W. Conk, People's Electric: Engaged Legal Education at Rutgers-Newark 
Law School in the 1960s and 1970s, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 503, 513 n. 40 (2012). 
 3. DIV. OF DISABILITY SERVS., N.J. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., NEW JERSEY 2009 
RESOURCES 15 (2009), available at http://www.state.nj.us/humanservices/dds/documents/RD_ 
09%283%29.pdf.  The public advocate was initially dismantled by Governor Christine Whit-
man, Cynthia N. McKee, Resurrecting Mount Laurel:  Using Title VIII Litigation to Achieve 
the Ultimate Mount Laurel Goal of Integration, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1338, 1345 n.58 
(1997), was revived in 2005, and then once more abolished in 2010, Public Advocate (2005-
2010), N.J. ST. LIBR., https://dspace.njstatelib.org/xmlui/handle/10929/19052 (last visited Apr. 
21, 2013). 
 4. N.J. GEN. ASSEMBLY, LEGISLATIVE FISCAL ESTIMATE TO ASSEMBLY, NO. 15, 
A.52:27E-1, at 1 (1994), available at http://law.njstatelib.org/law_files/njlh/ 
lh1994/L1994c58.pdf.  This Division survived the dismantling of the rest of the Public Advo-
cate’s office and is now housed in the Office of the Public Defender.  Id.  “The bill transfers 
the functions performed by the Division of Mental Health Advocacy and the Division of Ad-
vocacy for the Developmentally Disabled within the Department of the Public Advocate to the 
Office of the Public Defender . . . .”  Id. 
 5. Michael L. Perlin, Mental Patient Advocacy by a Patient Advocate, 54 PSYCHIATRIC 
Q. 169, 170–71 (1982); 5 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW:  CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL § 14-7, at 119–21 (2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter 5 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW:  
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL] (reprinting the final order of Dixon v. Cahill, No. L.30977/y-71 P.W. 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1973)); see Michael L. Perlin, “Justice’s Beautiful Face”:  Bob 
Sadoff and the Redemptive Promise of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 40 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 265, 
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One of the facilities in our jurisdictional ambit at the time was the Vet-
erans Hospital in Lyons, New Jersey.  Initially, our staff attorneys went there 
to represent individuals at commitment and periodic review hearings; but, 
after a time, it was clear that there was other work that needed to be done.  
The hospital was a dreary place (not as bad, certainly, as Greystone Park 
Psychiatric Hospital that remains, after nearly forty years, the most wretched 
facility I have ever seen in the United States),6 but dreary nonetheless:  not 
particularly clean, not particularly well-staffed, and with very little sense of 
life. 
But, there was more to it than that.  We realized—and this took a little 
while to sink in—that within the hospital, there were clearly hierarchical 
tiers.  Veterans of World War II (and the few remaining from World War I) 
and the Korean War were, by and large, treated far better than were the Vi-
etnam veterans.  This perplexed me—I certainly never spoke to a staff mem-
ber who had been active in the anti-war movement at any level—and trou-
bled me greatly. 
Why did this happen?  The Vietnam veterans were much younger than 
the others, of course, and were certainly more likely to be dually diagnosed 
as mentally ill and drug-dependent.  Many more had brushes with criminal 
law—usually low-level misdemeanors, though there were some who were 
charged with more serious offenses—and many more were disaffected with 
the world to which they came back.  There were no ticker-tape parades for 
these veterans, no jubilant crowds, no iconic photographs of welcome-home 
kisses.  And these veterans were far, far angrier than veterans of other 
wars—staff told me that the older vets were so grateful and this cohort was 
not.  The more we explored this, the more it became clear that there was a 
dual system at play:  Vietnam vets and everyone else.  We also discovered 
that some of the rights that we had been litigating so tirelessly for at the state 
and county hospitals were not available in the federally funded Department 
of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) hospitals—and that just did not seem right for so 
many reasons. 
So, we filed Falter v. Veterans’ Administration (Falter I),7 a class ac-
tion suit on behalf of all the residents of the VA.8  Following the litigation in 
  
265, 278 n.2 (2012); Michael L. Perlin, “May You Stay Forever Young”:  Robert Sadoff and 
the History of Mental Disability Law, 33 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 236, 236–37 (2005). 
 6. See Doe v. Klein, 1 Mental Disability L. Rep. 475, 475 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1977) (institutional right to treatment consent order); see also Michael L. Perlin, “Abandoned 
Love”:  The Impact of Wyatt v. Stickney on the Intersection Between International Human 
Rights and Domestic Mental Disability Law, 35 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 121, 123 n.21 (2011). 
 7. 502 F. Supp. 1178 (D.N.J. 1980). 
 8. Id. at 1178–79. 
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the Falter I case, the VA promulgated the first Patients’ Bill of Rights on 
behalf of persons in its facilities,9 and attention was paid to substantive areas 
of patients’ rights that all too often were previously ignored.10 
Writing some five years ago about the notion of “equality” in the con-
text of mental disability law, I said this about the Falter case: 
But, what has lasted with me most vividly from Falter I was one line 
of Judge Harold Ackerman’s initial decision:  In this opinion, “I am refer-
ring to how [plaintiffs] are treated as human beings.”11  I read that line in 
the slip opinion, and for a moment, my breath stopped.  Prior to that time, 
I had been representing persons with mental disabilities for nearly a dec-
ade, and litigated other class actions that truly had a vast impact on the 
New Jersey mental health system.12  But never before had a judge written a 
line like this in an opinion in one of my cases.13 
I begin my presentation today with this anecdote, because I think it is 
totally on-point with regard to this entire Symposium.  In my paper, I will 
seek to contextualize veterans courts in light of the therapeutic jurisprudence 
(TJ) movement, the turn to problem-solving courts of all sorts (especially 
focusing on mental health courts), but also, and certainly not least in terms of 
importance, the societal ambivalence that we have shown to veterans in the 
four decades since the Vietnam War. 
I will discuss the meaning of TJ, and then argue that its focus on the ac-
tual impact of law on people’s lives, on the law’s influence on emotional life 
and psychological well-being, and on the need for law to value psychological 
health and avoid the imposition of anti-therapeutic consequences whenever 
possible can serve as a template for a veterans court model—if we are to 
expand these courts robustly.  TJ is the explicit inspiration for many of the 
most important problem-solving courts (including Judge Ginger Lerner-
  
 9. Falter v. Veterans Admin. (Falter II), 632 F. Supp. 196, 203 (D.N.J. 1986) (“In De-
cember 1982, the V.A. Patients’ Bill of Rights was promulgated.”). 
 10. See id. at 203, 205–08 (noting patients’ rights such as rights to privacy while using 
telephones, to privacy in reading mail, to visitation, and to attend religious services). 
 11. Falter I, 502 F. Supp. at 1185. 
 12. See 5 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW:  CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, supra note 5, § 14-4, 
at 66–74 (discussing the stipulation settlement of Schindenwolf v. Klein, No. L41293-75 P.W. 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975)); 2 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW:  CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL § 3C-7.1i, at 442 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing the right of patients to participate in 
voluntary, therapeutic, compensated work programs as an aspect of the right to treatment); see 
also Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 269 (3d Cir. 1983) (discussing the right of institutional-
ized psychiatric patients to refuse treatment). 
 13. Michael L. Perlin & John Douard, “Equality, I Spoke That Word/As If a Wedding 
Vow”:  Mental Disability Law and How We Treat Marginalized Persons, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 9, 10 (2008–2009) (discussing this aspect of Falter I); see also Falter I, 502 F. Supp. at 
1178, 1185. 
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Wren’s mental health court in Broward County),14 but it is also clear that 
many such courts—specifically, some drug courts—do not follow TJ princi-
ples, existing instead in a due process-free zone—implicitly rejecting the 
basic TJ “premise that therapeutic outcomes cannot trump due process.”15  
Just as mental health courts should ensure that defendants receive dignity and 
respect and are given a sense of voice and validation, so should veterans 
courts.  And this must be done in the specific context of veterans who have 
returned—not just from Vietnam, but from the first Gulf War, the later Iraqi 
War, and the ongoing Afghanistani War—veterans who have been diagnosed 
with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) at frightening rates16 and who con-
tinue to bear the invisible wounds of battle.17 
This must all be weighed through the filter of the way that our treatment 
of injured war veterans provides a vivid example of society’s general ambiv-
alence toward guaranteeing robust social rights, an ambivalence reflected in 
my experiences in the VA hospitals some thirty years ago.  I believe that 
Judge Ackerman’s observation must be at the forefront of any assessment of 
veterans courts. 
  
 14. See Michael L. Perlin, “There Are No Trials Inside the Gates of Eden”:  Mental 
Health Courts, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dignity, and the 
Promise of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in COERCIVE CARE:  LAW AND POLICY 193, 206–07 
(Bernadette McSherry & Ian Freckelton eds., 2013) [hereinafter PERLIN, “THERE ARE NO 
TRIALS INSIDE THE GATES OF EDEN”]. 
 15. See id. at 207; Andrew Fulkerson, How Much Process Is Due in the Drug Court?, 
CRIM. L. BULL. (Thomson Reuters), Summer 2012 (“The answer is the same due process that 
is provided in any other case wherein a defendant faces revocation of probation.”).  For criti-
cism of a court decision holding that a defendant had no right to counsel at a hearing to termi-
nate him from a drug program, see Dunson v. Commonwealth, 57 S.W.3d 847, 850 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 2001) and Fulkerson, supra, note 15 (“The Dunson holding renders the drug court a 
court in name only and thus is not required to provide any of the formalities and due process 
protections of a real court.”). 
 16. On how the Iraqi and Afghan war experiences, for these purposes, have been signifi-
cantly different from the experiences of veterans in other wars, see Steven Berenson, The 
Movement Toward Veterans Courts, CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y, May–June 
2010, at 37, 37–38. 
First, individual servicemembers have been subjected to more frequent and longer deploy-
ments to the front than in previous conflicts.  Second, the counterinsurgency type of warfare 
blurs periods of battle and periods of rest, prompting the stressful constant vigilance that can 
lead to psychological ailments.  Third, improvements in protective equipment and battlefield 
medicine have allowed more victims of battlefield trauma to survive but often with lingering 
effects from their injuries.  And, fourth, the signature weapon of the opposition—the impro-
vised explosive device—often causes traumatic brain injuries that are difficult to diagnose and 
treat and may not present symptoms until well after the injury. 
Id. at 38 (footnotes omitted). 
 17. See id. at 37. 
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Despite generally low recidivism rates,18 veterans courts have received 
criticism, as some have argued that they provide veterans with a hall pass 
“‘to certain criminal-defense rights that others don’t have,’” and that, from 
an entirely different perspective, they are stigmatizing because they “perpet-
uate the stereotype that veterans are returning ‘war-crazy.’”19  I will address 
these and other criticisms in my paper. 
One issue that has received almost no attention is a critical one that we 
are just beginning to take seriously in the mental health courts context:  How 
can we assure that there is experienced, dedicated, and knowledgeable coun-
sel assigned to represent defendants in such tribunals?  We know that if there 
has been any constant in modern mental disability law in its thirty-five year 
history, it is the near-universal reality that counsel assigned to represent indi-
viduals at involuntary civil commitment cases is likely to be ineffective.  
How can we be sure that counsel in these cases will become more effective? 
I will conclude by offering some conclusions and suggestions for those 
jurisdictions that are implementing veterans courts, so as to optimally assure 
adherence to TJ values in a court setting that continues to provide litigants 
with the full range of constitutional rights to which they are entitled. 
Bob Dylan recorded John Brown in 1963.20  The song is a “biting screed 
demolishing Hollywood conceptions of war heroes”21 that “links the antiwar 
mentality with the generation gap.”22  It begins: 
John Brown went off to war to fight on a foreign shore 
His mama sure was proud of him! 
He stood straight and tall in his uniform and all 
His mama’s face broke out all in a grin,23 
but, later, when he returns home: 
  
 18. See Cathy Ho Hartsfield, Note, Deportation of Veterans:  The Silent Battle for Natu-
ralization, 64 RUTGERS L. REV. 835, 859 (2012) (concluding that veterans courts “have seen 
great success in reducing recidivism rates”).  But see Jack W. Smith, The Anchorage, Alaska 
Veterans Court and Recidivism:  July 6, 2004–December 31, 2010, 29 ALASKA L. REV. 93, 
107 (2012) (noting the recidivism rate is only “slightly better” in the Anchorage Veterans 
Court). 
 19. These arguments are summarized in Hartsfield, supra note 18, at 860.  See also infra 
Part III. 
 20. OLIVER TRAGER, KEYS TO THE RAIN:  THE DEFINITIVE BOB DYLAN ENCYCLOPEDIA 339 
(Bob Nirkind & Marian Appellof eds., 2004). 
 21. Id. at 338. 
 22. TIM RILEY, HARD RAIN:  A DYLAN COMMENTARY 51 (1992). 
 23. BOB DYLAN, John Brown, on THE BOOTLEG SERIES VOL. 9–THE WITMARK DEMOS:  
1962–1964 (Columbia Records 2010). 
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Oh his face was all shot up and his hand was all blown off 
And he wore a metal brace around his waist 
He whispered kind of slow, in a voice she did not know 
While she couldn’t even recognize his face!24 
and ends: 
As he turned away to walk, his Ma was still in shock 
At seein’ the metal brace that helped him stand 
But as he turned to go, he called his mother close 
And he dropped his medals down into her hand.25 
The song—the showstopper of Dylan’s 2001 tour “as U.S. bombs were 
falling on Kabul”26—tells the listener “of the deception of war, and its true 
effects on the individual,”27 and is a song “to come [on Memorial Day] after 
we sweep up from the parades and put away the speakers’ microphones.”28  
If there were a soundtrack to this Symposium, it would include this song. 
  
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. TRAGER, supra note 20, at 339.  I may have heard Dylan sing this in the 1960s; I 
honestly do not remember.  I do know that I have seen him sing it at least five times in more 
recent years, last in Brooklyn in August 2008, during the heat of the Obama/McCain cam-
paign.  My review of the concert notes the political connection:  “The high points of the night 
were *John Brown* and *Masters of War*, both musically and politically.  Here was Bob, in 
Brooklyn . . . with an audience as blue state as he’ll ever get, and he hammered home the 
reminder that we do, indeed, live in a political world.”  Michael Perlin, Reviews:  Brooklyn, 
New York, Prospect Park Bandshell, BOBLINKS.COM, http://www.boblinks.com/081208r 
.html#10 (last visited April 21, 2013). 
 27. Amy Blanton, Bob Dylan:  An Impact on American Society in the 1960’s 8 (Apr. 10, 
2001) (unpublished student paper, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), available at 
http://www.unc.edu/~ablanton/BobDylan.pdf. 
 28. A Memorial Day Song:  John Brown, NIGHTLY SONG (May 27, 2011), http:// 
nightlysong.com/category/bob-dylan/. 
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II. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE29 
One of the most important legal theoretical developments of the past 
two decades has been the creation and dynamic growth of TJ.30  Initially em-
ployed in cases involving individuals with mental disabilities, but subse-
quently expanded far beyond that narrow area, TJ presents a new model for 
assessing the “impact of case law and legislation,” recognizing that, as a 
therapeutic agent, the law can have “therapeutic or anti-therapeutic conse-
quences.”31  The ultimate aim of TJ is to determine whether legal “rules, pro-
cedures, and [lawyer] roles can or should be reshaped . . . to enhance their 
therapeutic potential [while not] subordinating due process principles.”32  
  
 29. This section is largely adapted from Michael L. Perlin, “Striking for the Guardians 
and Protectors of the Mind”:  The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Mental Disabili-
ties and the Future of Guardianship Law, 117 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1159, 1183–89 (2013) [here-
inafter Perlin, “Striking for the Guardians and Protectors of the Mind”] and Michael L. 
Perlin, Understanding the Intersection Between International Human Rights and Mental Dis-
ability Law:  THE ROLE OF DIGNITY, IN THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CRIME 
AND JUSTICE STUDIES 191, 199 (Bruce Arrigo & Heather Bersot eds., 2013) [hereinafter 
PERLIN, UNDERSTANDING THE INTERSECTION]. 
 30. See David Finkelman & Thomas Grisso, Therapeutic Jurisprudence:  From Idea to 
Application, in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY:  DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 
587, 588 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1996); see also 1 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, 
MENTAL DISABILITY LAW:  CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 2D-3, at 534–39 (2d ed. 1989); DAVID B. 
WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE:  THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT 3–4 (1990); 
BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT:  A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL 7 (2005) 
[hereinafter WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT]; David B. Wexler, Two Decades of Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence, 24 TOURO L. REV. 17, 19 (2008).  Wexler first used the term in a paper he 
presented to the National Institute of Mental Health in 1987.  See David B. Wexler, Putting 
Mental Health into Mental Health Law:  Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
27, 32–33 (1992). 
 31. Michael L. Perlin, “His Brain Has Been Mismanaged with Great Skill”:  How Will 
Jurors Respond to Neuroimaging Testimony in Insanity Defense Cases?, 42 AKRON L. REV. 
885, 912 (2009); see Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton, Mental Health Law and Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence, in DISPUTES & DILEMMAS IN HEALTH LAW 91, 91–92 (Ian Freckelton & Kerry 
Petersen eds., 2006). 
 32. Michael L. Perlin, “You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks”:  Sanism in Clinical 
Teaching, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 683, 719 n.195 (2003) [hereinafter Perlin, “You Have Dis-
cussed Lepers and Crooks”]; see Michael L. Perlin, “And My Best Friend, My Doctor/Won’t 
Even Say What It Is I’ve Got”:  The Role and Significance of Counsel in Right to Refuse 
Treatment Cases, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735, 752–53 (2005) [hereinafter Perlin, “And My 
Best Friend, My Doctor/Won’t Even Say What It Is I’ve Got”]; Michael L. Perlin, “Everybody 
is Making Love/or Else Expecting Rain”:  Considering the Sexual Autonomy Rights of Per-
sons Institutionalized Because of Mental Disability in Forensic Hospitals and in Asia, 83 
WASH. L. REV. 481, 489–90 (2008) [hereinafter Perlin, “Everybody is Making Love/or Else 
Expecting Rain”].  On how TJ “might be a redemptive tool in efforts to combat sanism, as a 
means of ‘strip[ping] bare the law’s sanist façade,’” see Michael L. Perlin, “Baby, Look Inside 
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There is an inherent tension in this inquiry, but David Wexler clearly identi-
fies how it must be resolved:  The law’s use of “mental health information to 
improve therapeutic functioning [cannot] imping[e] upon justice concerns.”33  
As I have written elsewhere, “an inquiry into therapeutic outcomes does not 
mean that therapeutic concerns ‘trump’ civil rights and civil liberties.”34 
TJ “asks us to look at law as it actually impacts people’s lives”35 and 
“focuses on the law’s [influence] on emotional life and psychological well-
being.”36  It suggests that “law should value psychological health, should 
strive to avoid imposing anti-therapeutic consequences whenever possible, 
and when consistent with other values served by law, should attempt to bring 
about healing and wellness.”37  TJ understands that, “when attorneys fail to 
acknowledge their clients’ negative emotional reactions to the judicial pro-
cess, the clients are inclined to regard the lawyer as indifferent and a part of a 
criminal system bent on punishment.”38  By way of example, TJ “aims to 
offer social science evidence that limits the use of the incompetency label by 
narrowly defining its use and minimizing its psychological and social disad-
vantage.”39 
  
Your Mirror”:  The Legal Profession’s Willful and Sanist Blindness to Lawyers with Mental 
Disabilities, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 589, 591 (2008) [hereinafter Perlin, “Baby, Look Inside Your 
Mirror”].  See also Ian Freckelton, Therapeutic Jurisprudence Misunderstood and Misrepre-
sented:  The Price and Risks of Influence, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 575, 585–86 (2008); Ber-
nard P. Perlmutter, George’s Story:  Voice and Transformation Through the Teaching and 
Practice of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in a Law School Child Advocacy Clinic, 17 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 561, 599 n.111 (2005). 
 33. David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Changing Conceptions of Legal 
Scholarship, 11 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 17, 21 (1993); see also David B. Wexler, Applying the Law 
Therapeutically, 5 APPLIED & PREVENTIVE PSYCHOL. 179, 179–80 (1996). 
 34. Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 407, 412 (2000); Michael L. 
Perlin, “Where the Winds Hit Heavy on the Borderline”:  Mental Disability Law, Theory and 
Practice, “Us” and “Them”, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 775, 782 (1998). 
 35. Bruce J. Winick, Foreword:  Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspectives on Dealing 
with Victims of Crime, 33 NOVA L. REV. 535, 535 (2009). 
 36. David B. Wexler, Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence:  Psycholegal Soft Spots and 
Strategies, in Practicing THERAPEUTIC Jurisprudence:  Law as a Helping Profession 45, 45 
(Dennis P. Stolle et al. eds., 2000). 
 37. Bruce J. Winick, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Model for Civil Commitment, in 
INVOLUNTARY DETENTION AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE:  INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 
ON CIVIL COMMITMENT 23, 26 (Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton eds., 2003). 
 38. Evelyn H. Cruz, Competent Voices:  Noncitizen Defendants and the Right to Know 
the Immigration Consequences of Plea Agreements, 13 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 47, 59 (2010). 
 39. Claire B. Steinberger, Persistence and Change in the Life of the Law:  Can Therapeu-
tic Jurisprudence Make a Difference?, 27 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 55, 65 (2003).  The most 
thoughtful, sympathetic critique of TJ remains Christopher Slobogin’s Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence:  Five Dilemmas to Ponder.  See Christopher Slobogin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence:  
Five Dilemmas to Ponder, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 193, 195, 218–19 (1995). 
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In recent years, scholars have considered a vast range of topics through 
a TJ lens, including, but not limited to, all aspects of mental disability law, 
domestic relations law, criminal law and procedure, employment law, gay 
rights law, and tort law.40  As Ian Freckelton has noted, “it is a tool for gain-
ing a new and distinctive perspective utilizing socio-psychological insights 
into the law and its applications.”41  It is also part of a growing comprehen-
sive movement in the law towards establishing more humane and psycho-
logically optimal ways of handling legal issues collaboratively, creatively, 
and respectfully.42  These alternative approaches optimize the psychological 
well-being of individuals, relationships, and communities dealing with a le-
gal matter, and acknowledge concerns beyond strict legal rights, duties, and 
obligations.43  In its aim to use the law to empower individuals, enhance 
rights, and promote well-being, TJ has been described “as a sea-change in 
ethical thinking about the role of law . . . a movement towards a more dis-
tinctly relational approach to the practice of law . . . which emphasise[s] psy-
chological wellness over adversarial triumphalism.”44  That is, TJ supports an 
ethic of care.45 
One of the central principles of TJ is a commitment to dignity.46  Pro-
fessor Amy Ronner describes the “three Vs”—voice, validation, and volun-
tariness47—arguing: 
  
 40. See Michael L. Perlin, “Things Have Changed”:  Looking at Non-Institutional Men-
tal Disability Law Through the Sanism Filter, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 535, 543–45 (2002–
2003). 
 41. Freckelton, supra note 32, at 576. 
 42. Susan Daicoff, The Role of Therapeutic Jurisprudence Within the Comprehensive 
Law Movement, in PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE:  LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION 
465, 465 (Dennis P. Stolle et al. eds., 2000). 
 43. See id. at 468. 
 44. Warren Brookbanks, Therapeutic Jurisprudence:  Conceiving an Ethical Framework, 
8 J.L. & MED. 328, 329–30 (2001); see also Bruce J. Winick, Overcoming Psychological 
Barriers to Settlement:  Challenges for the TJ Lawyer, in THE AFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL:  PRACTICING LAW AS A HEALING PROFESSION 342 (Marjorie A. Silver ed., 2007); 
Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, The Use of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Law School 
Clinical Education:  Transforming the Criminal Law Clinic, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 605, 605–06 
(2006).  The use of the phrase TJ dates to CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE:  
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT 100 (1982). 
 45. See, e.g., Gregory Baker, Do You Hear the Knocking at the Door?  A “Therapeutic” 
Approach to Enriching Clinical Legal Education Comes Calling, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 379, 
385 (2006); Brookbanks, supra note 44, at 328–30; David B. Wexler, Not Such a Party 
Pooper:  An Attempt to Accommodate (Many of) Professor Quinn’s Concerns About Thera-
peutic Jurisprudence Criminal Defense Lawyering, 48 B.C. L. REV. 597, 599 (2007); Winick 
& Wexler, supra note 44, at 607. 
 46. See WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT, supra note 30, at 161. 
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 What “the three Vs” commend is pretty basic:  [L]itigants 
must have a sense of voice or a chance to tell their story to a deci-
sion maker.  If that litigant feels that the tribunal has genuinely lis-
tened to, heard, and taken seriously the litigant’s story, the litigant 
feels a sense of validation.  When litigants emerge from a legal 
proceeding with a sense of voice and validation, they are more at 
peace with the outcome.  Voice and validation create a sense of 
voluntary participation, one in which the litigant experiences the 
proceeding as less coercive.  Specifically, the feeling on the part of 
litigants that they voluntarily partook in the very process that en-
gendered the end result or the very judicial pronunciation that af-
fects their own lives can initiate healing and bring about improved 
behavior in the future.  In general, human beings prosper when 
they feel that they are making, or at least participating in, their 
own decisions.48 
Problem-solving courts grew out of an interdisciplinary approach—an 
approach immersed in TJ—to address the underlying problem, not just the 
symptoms, of social issues such as substance abuse, domestic violence, child 
abuse, and mental illness.49  The creation of these courts “acknowledge[s] 
that the one-size-fits-all structure of the American criminal justice system 
often leaves much to be desired.”50  There is an extensive literature on the 
relationship between TJ and problem-solving courts in general,51 between TJ 
and mental health courts52 and drug courts53 in particular, and, more globally, 
  
 47. Amy D. Ronner, The Learned-Helpless Lawyer:  Clinical Legal Education and Ther-
apeutic Jurisprudence as Antidotes to Bartleby Syndrome, 24 TOURO L. REV. 601, 627 (2008).  
On the importance of voice, see Freckelton, supra note 32, at 588. 
 48. Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary Participation:  Therapeu-
tic Jurisprudence, Miranda and Juveniles, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 89, 94–95 (2002) (footnotes 
omitted); see also AMY D. RONNER, LAW, LITERATURE, AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 23 
(2010). 
 49. See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Problem Solving Courts, 
30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1055, 1060 (2003); see also Peggy Fulton Hora, Courting New Solu-
tions Using Problem-Solving Justice:  Key Components, Guiding Principles, Strategies, Re-
sponses, Models, Approaches, Blueprints and Tool Kits, 2 CHAPMAN J. CRIM. JUST. 7, 7–8 
(2011); Salmon A. Shomade & Roger E. Hartley, The Application of Network Analysis to the 
Study of Trial Courts, 31 JUST. SYS. J. 144, 146 (2010). 
 50. PERLIN, “THERE ARE NO TRIALS INSIDE THE GATES OF EDEN,” supra note 14, at 207. 
 51. See Hora, supra note 49, at 7, 10; see generally Cait Clarke & James Neuhard, Mak-
ing the Case:  Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Problem-Solving Practices Positively Impact 
Clients, the Justice Systems and Communities They Serve, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 781 (2005). 
 52. See, e.g., Nicola Ferencz & James McGuire, Mental Health Review Tribunals in the 
UK:  Applying a Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspective, CT. REV. (Am. Judges Ass’n), 
Spring 2000, at 48, 51; Thomas L. Hafemeister et al., Forging Links and Renewing Ties:  
 
11
Perlin: "John Brown Went Off to War": Considering Veterans Courts as Prob
Published by NSUWorks, 2013
456 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37  
between TJ and judging,54 and TJ and lawyering55 in these contexts.  But 
there has been very little written about the specific question of the role of TJ 
in veterans courts.56  The question to pose here is this:  Do such courts make 
it more likely that Professor Ronner’s vision—of voice, voluntariness, and 
validation—will be fulfilled? 
III. VETERANS COURTS 
Veterans courts have been established as part of an effort to seek “sys-
temic solutions that would allow the [judicial system] a greater range of tools 
to help struggling veterans than the traditional criminal justice alternatives of 
conviction and incarceration.”57  Explicitly, “‘[t]he rationale for veterans’ 
courts is based on the combat-related stress, financial instability, and other 
difficulties adjusting to life that confront many soldiers returning home from 
Iraq and Afghanistan.’”58  “The focus [of such courts] is on treatment, not 
  
Applying the Principles of Restorative and Procedural Justice to Better Respond to Criminal 
Offenders with a Mental Disorder, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 147, 183–84 (2012). 
 53. See, e.g., Salmon A. Shomade, Case Disposition in the Drug Court:  Who Is the Most 
Central Actor?, 31 JUST. SYS. J. 74, 74–75, 78–79 (2010); Pamela L. Simmons, Comment, 
Solving the Nation’s Drug Problem:  Drug Courts Signal a Move Toward Therapeutic Juris-
prudence, 35 GONZ. L. REV. 237, 258 (1999–2000).  The extent to which many drug courts 
actually do incorporate TJ principles is not at all clear.  See Michael S. King, Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence’s Challenge to the Judiciary, 1 ALASKA J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 2 (2011) [hereinafter 
King, Therapeutic Jurisprudence’s Challenge to the Judiciary] (critiquing some drug courts as 
not fulfilling TJ values); PERLIN, “THERE ARE NO TRIALS INSIDE THE GATES OF EDEN,” supra 
note 14, at 216–17. 
 54. See, e.g., King, Therapeutic Jurisprudence’s Challenge to the Judiciary, supra note 
53, at 3. 
 55. See, e.g., Paul Holland, Lawyering and Learning in Problem-Solving Courts, 34 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 185, 187 (2010); David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the 
Rehabilitative Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 743, 750 (2005). 
 56. But see Evan R. Seamone, The Veterans’ Lawyer as Counselor:  Using Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence to Enhance Client Counseling for Combat Veterans with Posttraumatic Stress 
Disorder, 202 MIL. L. REV. 185, 188 (2009) [hereinafter Seamone, The Veterans’ Lawyer as 
Counselor]; Samantha Walls, The Need for Special Veteran Courts, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 695, 716 (2011).  Professor David Wexler, one of the creators of TJ, has noted that TJ 
principles are now being employed in veterans courts.  See David B. Wexler, That’s What 
Friends Are For:  Mentors, LAP Lawyers, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, and Clients with Mental 
Illness 3 (Mar. 2012) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Wexler, That’s What Friends Are 
For], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1962725. 
 57. Berenson, supra note 16, at 39. 
 58. Marta Hoes, Comment, Invisible Wounds:  What Texas Should Be Doing for the 
Mental Health of Its Veterans, 13 TEX. TECH ADMIN. L.J. 369, 378 (2012). 
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punishment, and on getting [to] the root cause of anti-social behavior.”59  
Importantly, the courts “are premised on the assumption that, when possible, 
veterans should receive treatment for PTSD.”60  Many of the veterans courts 
consciously “utilize the therapeutic jurisprudence ideology in creating the 
treatment-rehabilitate model.”61 
Although the first veterans court was started in Anchorage, Alaska, in 
2004,62 most commentators pinpoint the start of the veterans court movement 
to the creation of the Buffalo Veterans Treatment Court in 2008.63  As de-
scribed by that court’s founding judge: 
The mission driving the Veterans Treatment Court is to successful-
ly habilitate veterans by diverting them from the traditional crimi-
nal justice system and providing them with the tools they need in 
order to lead a productive and law-abiding lifestyle.  In hopes of 
achieving this goal, the program provides veterans suffering from 
substance abuse issues, alcoholism, mental health issues, and emo-
tional disabilities with treatment, academic and vocational training, 
job skills, and placement services.  The program provides further 
ancillary services to meet the distinctive needs of each individual 
participant, such as housing, transportation, medical, dental, and 
other supportive services.64 
At this point in time, there are at least eighty such courts,65 and hun-
dreds are in the planning process.66  Potential participants are screened to 
weed out any individual who does not “show a willingness to undergo treat-
  
 59. Michael Daly Hawkins, Coming Home:  Accommodating the Special Needs of Mili-
tary Veterans to the Criminal Justice System, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 563, 570 (2010). 
 60. Adam Caine, Comment, Fallen from Grace:  Why Treatment Should Be Considered 
for Convicted Combat Veterans Suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, 78 UMKC L. 
REV. 215, 239 (2009). 
 61. Walls, supra note 56, at 716. 
 62. Hawkins, supra note 59, at 565. 
 63. Berenson, supra note 16, at 39; Robert T. Russell, Veterans Treatment Court:  A 
Proactive Approach, 35 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 357, 364 (2009). 
 64. Russell, supra note 63, at 357 n.†, 364. 
 65. William H. McMichael, The Battle on the Home Front, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2011, at 42, 
44.  For descriptions of other courts, see Stuart Ditzen, Supreme Court, Veterans Administra-
tion Host First Veterans’ Task Force Mtg., LAW. J. (Allegheny Cnty. Bar Ass’n), Mar. 12, 
2010, at 5, 5; Hawkins, supra note 59, at 565; Art Heinz, Nation’s First Online Training for 
Veterans Courts Mentors Launched by Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, LAW. J. (Allegheny 
Cnty. Bar Ass’n), Dec. 16, 2011, at 5, 5; Judy L. Marchman, Veterans Courts in Texas, 75 
TEX. B.J. 616, 616 (2012); Smith, supra note 18, at 93. 
 66. The History, JUST. FOR VETS, http://www.justiceforvets.org/vtc-history (last visited 
Apr. 21, 2013). 
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ment for his PTSD.”67  Most such courts accept only defendants charged with 
misdemeanors or non-violent felonies,68 although some allow defendants 
charged with violent felonies to participate.69  While there has been pointed 
criticism at the inclusion of some offenses (specifically, domestic violence) 
in the eligibility column,70 others take the position that precluding violent 
offenders in these courts is like having “a Veterans Court without veter-
ans.”71  In some veterans courts, “violent cases are not precluded from diver-
sion [specifically] because ‘combat veterans’ PTSD issues often manifest in 
aggressive behavior.’”72  Often, however, “[w]hen [veterans courts] do enroll 
violent offenders, many programs can, and do, require victim input prior to 
the admittance decision.”73 
These courts are often staffed with “a Veterans Service Representative 
(VSR), a fellow veteran whose role is similar to that of a caseworker,” and 
who “works as a counselor, develop[ing] a treatment plan, and refer[ring] . . . 
defendant[s] to alcohol, drug dependency, or mental health treatment centers 
  
 67. Walls, supra note 56, at 718.  See infra Part III.A. for a discussion of the significance 
of PTSD diagnoses in the creation and implementation of these courts. 
 68. See Berenson, supra note 16, at 39. 
 69. Pamela Kravetz, Note, Way off Base:  An Argument Against Intimate Partner Vio-
lence Cases in Veterans Treatment Courts, 4 VETERANS L. REV. 162, 183 & n.109 (2012); 
Marcia G. Shein, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in the Criminal Justice System:  From Vi-
etnam to Iraq and Afghanistan, FED. LAW., Sept. 2010, at 42, 49. 
 70. See Kravetz, supra note 69, at 186; see also infra Part V.E. 
 71. John Baker, John Baker:  We Need Veterans Courts in Minnesota.  Here’s Why., 
TWINCITIES.COM (Aug. 29, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.twincities.com/ opin-
ion/ci_15916530 (observing that “domestic-abuse case[s], bar fights, assault and battery, hit 
and run cases that result in injury, and DWI cases that result in injury[]” are largely “the types 
of cases that bring veterans into the criminal justice system in the first place”); see also Dahlia 
Lithwick, Specialized Courts for War Veterans Work Wonders.  But Why Stop at Veterans?, 
SLATE (Feb. 11, 2010, 1:33 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and 
_politics/jurisprudence/2010/02/a_separate_peace.html: 
Robert Alvarez, a psychotherapist with the Wounded Warrior program at Fort Carson, recently 
told a Denver newspaper that it’s a mistake to carve the most violent offenders out of the pro-
posed veterans court in Colorado:  “The violent offenders need help more than anybody. . . . 
[T]he very skills these people are taught to follow in combat are the skills that are a risk at 
home.  They’re trained to react instantly to a threat, because if not, people die.”  So as we con-
tinue to create specialized courts for our war veterans, one question worth probing is how it 
makes sense to give special services to those with the least to lose while withholding special 
services from those with the worst problems. 
Id. (alteration in original). 
 72. Evan R. Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilitative Ethic in Military Justice:  The Sus-
pended Punitive Discharge as a Method to Treat Military Offenders with PTSD and TBI and 
Reduce Recidivism, 208 MIL. L. REV. 1, 7 n.9 (2011) [hereinafter Seamone, Reclaiming the 
Rehabilitative Ethic in Military Justice]. 
 73. Id. at 8 n.9. 
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[where] necessary.”74  David Wexler has underscored that having such a 
mentor is an essential feature of such courts.75 
A. Issues Related to PTSD 
The story of General George Patton slapping a soldier in World War II 
is legendary. 
 During the action in Sicily, General Patton visited an evacua-
tion hospital.  He was conducted to the receiving tent, where [fif-
teen] casualties had just come in from the front. 
 “Where Were You Hurt?”  The General went down the line, 
asking each patient where he had been hurt.  On the edge of the 
fourth bed sat a soldier with no visible wounds.  He had been sent 
back by his divisional medical officer, tentatively diagnosed as a 
severe case of psychoneurosis.  He was still in battle dress. 
 The General asked him the routine question.  The soldier an-
swered:  “It’s my nerves.  I can hear the shells come over but I 
can’t hear them burst.” 
 Patton turned to the medical officer and asked, “What’s this 
man talking about?  What’s wrong with him--if anything?”  Patton 
began to shout at the man.  His high voice rose to a scream, in such 
language as:  “You dirty no-good------!  You cowardly--!  You’re a 
disgrace to the Army and you’re going right back to the front to 
fight, although that’s too good for you. . . .”  Patton reached for his 
white-handled single-action Colt. 
 The man sat quivering on his cot.  Patton slapped him sharply 
across the face, turned to the commanding medical officer who had 
come in when he heard Patton’s high-pitched imprecations.  “I 
want you to get that man out of here right away.  I won’t have the-
se other brave boys seeing such a bastard babied.”76 
  
 74. Hartsfield, supra note 18, at 859; see also Hawkins, supra note 59, at 565. 
 75. Wexler, That’s What Friends Are For, supra note 56, at 3.  On the value of the use of 
psychological techniques in such court settings, see Seamone, The Veterans’ Lawyer as Coun-
selor, supra note 56, at 198. 
 76. Michael E. McCarthy, Essay, Diversionary Tactics:  Alternative Procedures for the 
Prosecution of Military Veterans, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 475, 477–78 (2012). 
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One of the first law review articles to discuss PTSD characterized this—“the 
slap heard round the world”77—as “[a]n extreme example of military intoler-
ance for warrior weakness.”78  There is little question that, “[b]efore Vi-
etnam, no single event contributed more to public awareness of PTSD”79 
than this incident. 
PTSD is “a condition under which a person ‘experienced, witnessed, or 
was confronted with an event or events that involved actual or threatened 
death or serious injury, or that a threat to the physical integrity of self or oth-
ers’ and, ‘the person’s response involved intense fear, helplessness, or hor-
ror.’”80  “Symptoms of PTSD may include recurrent nightmares, difficulty 
falling asleep, hyper-vigilance . . . outbursts of anger,” exaggerated startle 
response, and memory impairment.81  “Individuals who suffer from this syn-
drome often show increased irritability, impulsive behavior and unpredicta-
ble explosions of aggression with little or no provocation.”82  Persons with 
PTSD often also have “panic disorders, obsessive-compulsive disorders, 
social phobias, and major depressive disorders.”83  “Combat is one of the 
most severe [PTSD] stressors.”84  Although it has been suggested that PTSD 
symptoms are relatively easy to feign,85 the use of new neuroscience tech-
  
 77. Paul G. Cassell, Restrictions on Press Coverage of Military Operations:  The Right of 
Access, Grenada, and “Off-the-Record Wars,” 73 GEO. L.J. 931, 972 n.284 (1985). 
 78. Michael J. Davidson, Note, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder:  A Controversial De-
fense for Veterans of a Controversial War, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 415, 434 n.151 (1988). 
 79. John Lockman, The Thousand Yard Stare:  Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, the In-
visible Casualty of War, ERNESTBECKERFOUND. (Apr. 7, 2011, 6:59 PM), 
http://www.ernestbecker.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=452:the-
thousand-yard-stare-post-traumatic-stress-disorder-the-invisible-casualty-of-war-
&catid=7:news-archives&Itemid=33. 
 80. 4 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW:  CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 9A-9.3b, at 
271 (2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter 4 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW:  CIVIL AND CRIMINAL]; see 
also AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 
467 (4th ed., text rev. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR]; Robert Kinscherff, Proposition:  A 
Personality Disorder May Nullify Responsibility for a Criminal Act, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
745, 746 (2010) (“[T]he recent movement to establish specialized ‘mental health courts’ for 
mentally ill defendants whose psychiatric conditions contributed in some measure to the con-
duct leading to arrest reflects the infusion of psychiatry into the criminal justice system.”). 
 81. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 80, at 464; Olympia Duhart, Soldier Suicides and OutCrit 
Jurisprudence:  An Anti-Subordination Analysis, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 883, 887 (2011) 
[hereinafter Duhart, Soldier Suicides]. 
 82. 4 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW:  CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, supra note 80, § 9A-9.3b, 
at 272; see also DSM-IV-TR, supra note 80, at 464. 
 83. Duhart, Soldier Suicides, supra note 81, at 887. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See, e.g., Erin M. Gover, Comment, Iraq as a Psychological Quagmire:  The Impli-
cations of Using Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder as a Defense for Iraq War Veterans, 28 
PACE L. REV. 561, 581 (2008). 
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niques in the development of external measures of assessment should obviate 
most of these concerns.86 
Through the post-Vietnam era, fact finders were “generally reluctant to 
accept the validity” of PTSD both in insanity defense cases and in sentencing 
mitigation cases.87  Thus, while at least one court characterized the evidence 
of PTSD in the case of a Vietnam war veteran as highly persuasive,88 in the 
course of an opinion affirming a jury’s rejection of the defendant’s insanity 
defense based largely on the defendant’s own testimony,89 other courts have 
narrowly ruled on the scope of expert witnesses who may permissibly testify 
as to the syndrome’s effects.90  “Similarly, defendants [were] mostly . . . 
‘surprisingly unsuccessful’91 in their attempts to use Vietnam stress syn-
drome or PTSD as a ground for the granting of a new trial in cases where the 
original convictions predated the formal recognition of the existence of Vi-
etnam stress syndrome.”92  Some defendants have been successful in their 
  
 86. Betsy J. Grey, Neuroscience, PTSD, and Sentencing Mitigation, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 
53, 104 (2012).  On the new uses of neuroscience in criminal law in general, see Michael L. 
Perlin, “And I See Through Your Brain”:  Access to Experts, Competency to Consent, and the 
Impact of Antipsychotic Medications in Neuroimaging Cases in the Criminal Trial Process, 
STAN. TECH. L. REV, (2009), http://stlr.standford.edu/pdf/perlin-and-i-see.pdf, and see also 
Perlin, “There Are No Trials Inside the Gates of Eden,” supra note 14; Michael L. Perlin & 
Valerie R. McClain, Unasked (and Unanswered) Questions About the Role of Neuroimaging 
in the Criminal Trial Process, 28 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 4 (2010). 
 87. 4 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW:  CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, supra note 80, § 9A-9.3b, 
at 273–74.  For a recent reconsideration, see Caine, supra note 60.  In one of the most poign-
ant examples, a jury explained to a trial judge why it rejected an insanity defense plea in the 
case of a Vietnam veteran charged with murder: 
We, the Jury, recognize the contribution of our Viet Nam [sic] veterans and those who lost 
their lives in Viet Nam [sic].  We feel that the trial of Wayne Felde has brought to the forefront 
those extreme stress disorders prevalent among thousands of our veterans. 
. . . . 
Through long and careful deliberation, through exposure to all the evidence, we felt that Mr. 
Felde was aware of right and wrong when Mr. Thompkins’ life was taken.  However, we 
pledge ourselves to contribute whatever we can to best meet the needs of our veterans. 
State v. Felde, 422 So. 2d 370, 380 n.9 (La. 1982). 
 88. Felde, 422 So. 2d at 380. 
 89. Id. at 380, 398; see also State v. Sharp, 418 So. 2d 1344, 1348 (La. 1982) (testimony 
admissible, but jury rejected insanity defense); State v. Cone, 665 S.W.2d 87, 92 (Tenn. 1984) 
(defendant’s pattern of conduct raised “serious doubts” about expert witness’ opinions), cert. 
granted sub nom., Bell v. Cone, 534 U.S. 1064 (2001), and rev’d, 535 U.S. 685 (2002). 
 90. See, e.g., United States v. Crosby, 713 F.2d 1066, 1076–77 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 91. Elizabeth J. Delgado, Note, Vietnam Stress Syndrome and the Criminal Defendant, 
19 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 473, 495 (1985). 
 92. 4 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW:  CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, supra note 80, § 9A–9.3b, 
at 273. 
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arguments that evidence of PTSD should be admissible at sentencing;93 how-
ever, a student author has concluded that the courts’ decisions in admitting 
the evidence appear “to be based on the nature of the crime and the defend-
ant’s success in rehabilitation,” rather than the underlying syndrome.94  Inter-
estingly, the Supreme Court of the United States has relatively recently ruled, 
in a death penalty case, that attorneys are required to present evidence of 
PTSD when it is available.95  There, although the defendant had been a deco-
rated Korean War veteran, his court-appointed counsel presented no evi-
dence whatsoever of his military service to the jury.96  The court noted that 
had such evidence been presented, “the jury might [have found] mitigating 
the intense stress and mental and emotional toll that combat took on Por-
ter.”97  The Court added language especially relevant to the inquiry we are 
focusing upon today:  “Our Nation has a long tradition of according leniency 
to veterans in recognition of their service, especially for those who fought on 
the front lines as Porter did.”98 
One of the clearly articulated reasons for the surge in popularity in vet-
erans courts has been the number of veterans diagnosed with PTSD who 
have become involved with the criminal justice system.99  A startling 30% of 
all male soldiers who served in Vietnam “experienced PTSD at some point in 
their lives,”100 and it is estimated that, already, between 10-20% of all veter-
ans returning from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan exhibit characteristics of 
PTSD.101  Estimates of the percentage of those who have sought treatment for 
this condition range from 23-40%.102 
  
 93. E.g., State v. Spawr, 653 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tenn. 1983); Geraldine L. Brotherton, 
Note, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder—Opening Pandora’s Box?, 17 NEW ENG. L. REV. 91, 
91 n.1 (1981–1982) (listing early unreported cases in which PTSD was asserted as a sentence-
mitigation factor).  But see United States v. Krutschewski, 541 F. Supp. 142, 142–43 (D. 
Mass. 1982); State v. Pettit, 661 P.2d 767, 769 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983); State v. Watson, 316 
S.E.2d 293, 296 (N.C. 1984). 
 94. Delgado, supra note 91, at 500. 
 95. Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 43–44 (2009) (per curiam). 
 96. Id. at 40. 
 97. Id. at 43–44. 
 98. Id. at 43. 
 99. Grey, supra note 86, at 72. 
One final aspect of the increasing acceptance of mitigation for veterans who suffer from PTSD 
can be found in the recent popularity of veterans’ courts.  These courts are designed to keep 
veterans with mental health issues, including PTSD, who are charged with criminal behavior 
out of the traditional justice system and place them into treatment programs instead. 
Id. 
 100. F. Don Nidiffer & Spencer Leach, To Hell and Back:  Evolution of Combat-Related 
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, 29 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 1, 11 (2010). 
 101. Id. at 12; see also Hartsfield, supra note 18, at 851; Charles W. Hoge et al., Combat 
Duty in Iraq and Afghanistan, Mental Health Problems, and Barriers to Care, 351 NEW ENG. 
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“Veterans who suffer from PTSD may face criminal charges because 
the symptoms that they suffer from can consequently lead them to commit 
criminal offenses.”103  “The relationship between PTSD and criminal offend-
ing is considered to be so significant that the president of the National Veter-
ans Federation . . . warns that the criminal justice system is facing an epi-
demic of veterans with PTSD being charged with crimes.”104  This relation-
ship is “well-recognized by researchers and psychologists,” and increasingly, 
by the courts.105  Of course, so many of the clients of veterans courts have 
been diagnosed with PTSD.106 
 
IV. SOCIETAL AMBIVALENCE 
The scar left on the national psyche by the war in Vietnam has never 
healed; it likely never will.107  We know that the societal ambivalence that 
followed the end of the war—ambivalence reflected in areas as disparate as 
decision-making with regard to returning all the American war dead to the 
U.S.,108 Supreme Court cases about draft card burning,109 the relationship 
  
J. MED. 13, 13 (2004), available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMoa040603; 
McCarthy, supra note 76, at 479; One in Five Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans Suffer from 
PTSD or Major Depression, RAND CORP. (Apr. 17, 2008), http://www.rand. 
org/news/press/2008/04/17.html. 
 102. Hartsfield, supra note 18, at 851. 
 103. Jillian M. Cavanaugh, Note, Helping Those Who Serve:  Veterans Treatment Courts 
Foster Rehabilitation and Reduce Recidivism for Offending Combat Veterans, 45 NEW ENG. 
L. REV. 463, 468 (2011). 
 104. Melissa Hamilton, Reinvigorating Actus Reus:  The Case for Involuntary Actions by 
Veterans with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 340, 341 (2011). 
 105. Walls, supra note 56, at 712. 
 106. Evan R. Seamone, Attorneys as First-Responders:  Recognizing the Destructive Na-
ture of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder on the Combat Veteran’s Legal Decision-Making Pro-
cess, 202 MIL. L. REV. 144, 155 (2009); Seamone, The Veterans’ Lawyer as Counselor, supra 
note 56, at 186; Wexler, That’s What Friends Are For, supra note 56, at 13. 
 107. For a comprehensive account, see MELVIN SMALL, AT THE WATER’S EDGE:  
AMERICAN POLITICS AND THE VIETNAM WAR (2005), and see id. at 217–24 for a comprehen-
sive bibliography of sources. 
 108. G. KURT PIEHLER, REMEMBERING WAR THE AMERICAN WAY 168 (1995); see also 
Mary L. Clark, Keep Your Hands off My (Dead) Body:  A Critique of the Ways in Which the 
State Disrupts the Personhood Interests of the Deceased and His or Her Kin in Disposing of 
the Dead and Assigning Identity in Death, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 45, 58–59 (2005). 
 109. See Wilson R. Huhn, Assessing the Constitutionality of Laws That Are Both Content-
Based and Content-Neutral:  The Emerging Constitutional Calculus, 79 IND. L.J. 801, 814 
(2004) (discussing how the Court’s decision in United States v. O’Brien “reveals an ambiva-
lence that may reflect the divisiveness of the Vietnam War”). 
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between American colleges and the military,110 the designs of war memori-
als,111 social attitudes toward “obedience to established authority, duty, sub-
ordination, and [drug-related] criminal activity,”112 and in the military’s pur-
suit of the war itself113—has played out in many ways, including, specifical-
ly, how we treat Vietnam veterans in the criminal justice system.  The am-
bivalence of the jurors in State v. Felde114 is a perfect reflection of the am-
bivalence of the general public,115 and it is a factor we cannot ignore in our 
analysis of the underlying issues being discussed.116 
  
 110. See Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Challenging the Wisdom of Solomon:  The 
First Amendment and Military Recruitment on Campus, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 205, 
236–38 (2004). 
 111. See Robin Wagner-Pacifici & Barry Schwartz, The Vietnam Veterans Memorial:  
Commemorating a Difficult Past, 97 AM. J. SOC. 376, 377–78, 381 (1991). 
 112. See James B. Thwing, Service Connection:  A Bridge Over Troubled Waters (pt. 2), 
ARMY LAW., June 1986, at 26, 26. 
 113. See, e.g., Francis Dymond, Book Note, Choosing War:  The Lost Chance for Peace 
and the Escalation of War in Vietnam, 168 MIL. L. REV. 220, 220 (2001). 
 114. 422 So. 2d 370 (La. 1982); see also supra note 88. 
 115. Id. at 380 & n.9. 
 116. Such ambivalence on the part of general public is also clear regarding the legitimacy 
of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  See Olympia Duhart, PTSD and Women Warriors:  
Causes, Controls and a Congressional Cure, 18 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 327, 336–37 
(2012).  On the ambivalence of the “United States and other occupying forces in Iraq ‘toward 
human rights and humanitarian law concerns,’” see Karima Bennoune, Toward a Human 
Rights Approach to Armed Conflict:  Iraq 2003, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 171, 217–
18 (2004), and Joe Stork & Fred Abrahams, Sidelined:  Human Rights in Postwar Iraq, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2004:  HUMAN RIGHTS AND ARMED CONFLICT 93, 93–
94 (2004). 
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V. CRITICISMS OF VETERANS COURTS117 
As noted earlier, there has been a series of criticisms leveled at the crea-
tion of veterans courts.118  In this section, I will discuss these criticisms and 
explain why I find them wanting. 
A. The “Free Pass” Argument 
“The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has opposed [v]eterans 
[c]ourts, arguing that veterans are provided ‘an automatic free pass based on 
military status to certain criminal-defense rights that others don’t have.’”119  
This argument tracks a statement attributed to “Judge Charles B. Kornmann 
of the U.S. District Court for South Dakota [who] ‘cautioned [a] jury that 
nobody got “a free pass to shoot somebody” because they “went to Iraq or 
Afghanistan or the moon.”’”120 
I believe this argument is misguided, for the reasons stated by Jillian 
Cavanaugh: 
[T]here is no “free pass” when it comes to admitting veterans into 
a veterans treatment court; their eligibility is based not upon their 
status as a military veteran, but rather upon the notion that their 
  
 117. There is some irony here that for years there have been veterans administrative courts 
to adjudicate questions of benefits payments, see, e.g., Steven Reiss & Matthew Tenner, Ef-
fects of Representation by Attorneys in Cases Before VA:  The “New Paternalism,” 1 
VETERANS L. REV. 2, 2 (2009), and that the existence of these courts has never, to the best of 
my knowledge, been raised in the debate about the courts under discussion here.  Such 
courts—the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims—are Article I courts; they 
may “(1) decide any relevant questions of law that arise in a benefits proceeding, (2) compel 
VA action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed, (3) hold unlawful or set aside actions 
or regulations adopted by the VA, and (4) reverse the VA’s fact-finding if it is clearly errone-
ous.”  Paul R. Gugliuzza, Veterans Benefits in 2010:  A New Dialogue Between the Supreme 
Court and the Federal Circuit, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1201, 1209 (2011); see also 38 U.S.C. § 
7261(a)(1)–(4) (2006).  An interesting parallel can be made to the mental health courts debate.  
We discuss extensively the pros and cons of such courts, while ignoring the reality that there 
are other mental health courts in which individuals are regularly committed to psychiatric 
hospitals with virtually no due process protections.  See PERLIN, “THERE ARE NO TRIALS 
INSIDE THE GATES OF EDEN,” supra note 14, at 193–195, 212 (comparing problem-solving 
based mental health courts to “non-specialized [courts that] I have observed across the nation, 
in which persons with mental disabilities are regularly treated as third-class citizens by (at the 
best) bored or (at the worst) malevolent trial judges”). 
 118. See supra Parts I, III. 
 119. Hartsfield, supra note 18, at 860. 
 120. Anthony E. Giardino, Essay, Combat Veterans, Mental Health Issues, and the Death 
Penalty:  Addressing the Impact of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Traumatic Brain 
Injury, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2955, 2962 n.38 (2009). 
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criminal conduct was caused by an underlying physical or psycho-
logical injury that was incurred during military service in a combat 
zone.121 
B. The Disparity Argument 
“Other concerns are that [v]eterans [c]ourts exclude non-veterans who 
suffer from PTSD but are not eligible for special provisions through these 
problem-solving courts,”122 resulting in “disparity in treatment between,” for 
example, “non-violent drug offenders who are not veterans and those who 
are.”123  I am in partial agreement with Samantha Walls’s response to this—
that non-veteran drug offenders, in most jurisdictions, “can take advantage of 
. . . drug-court programs”124—but my concern about the quality of many drug 
programs125 makes me uneasy to endorse it without qualification.  My posi-
tion here is rather the same one that I have used in support of mental health 
courts when parallel arguments have been raised:  By increasing the likeli-
hood of a person with mental disability being diverted out of the criminal 
justice system—where he is likely to be treated as a third or fourth class citi-
zen if those terms have any meaningful content or context—such courts 
  
 121. Cavanaugh, supra note 103, at 479. 
It is important to understand that veterans in veterans treatment courts do not enjoy a privilege 
based upon their status as a military service member.  “The [veterans treatment court] won’t be 
a free pass for men and women accused of crimes just because they happen to have a military 
background.” 
Id. at 479–80 n.123 (quoting “Mitch Lyles, director of adult probation for Denton County”); 
see also B.J. Lewis, Denton Program Allows Alternate Court Sentencing for Veterans, 
DALLASNEWS.COM (Dec. 22, 2009, 2:36 AM), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/community-
news/denton/headlines/20091222-Denton-program-allows-alternate-court-sentencing-
8915.ece. 
Consider one concern expressed by an American Civil Liberties Union spokesman comparing 
a proposed veterans treatment court in Nevada with the veterans treatment court established in 
Cook County, Illinois:  “The concern expressed in Nevada was that individuals who served in 
the military were sort of automatically transferred into this special court and were provided 
some options for lower-level sentences.  It was based on the [military] status rather than the 
crime.” 
Cavanaugh, supra note 103, at 480 n.123 (emphasis omitted). 
 122. Hartsfield, supra note 18, at 860. 
 123. Hawkins, supra note 59, at 571; see also Walls, supra note 56, at 721 (“The govern-
ment is arguably creating a first-class and second-class criminal-justice system, based upon 
determining who is more deserving of treatment:  [N]on-veterans who suffer from PTSD or 
veterans who suffer from PTSD.”). 
 124. Walls, supra note 56, at 721. 
 125. See PERLIN, “THERE ARE NO TRIALS INSIDE THE GATES OF EDEN,” supra note 14, at 
207, 216; see also Holland, supra note 55, at 187 (discussing the position of the National 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as being “[r]elatively sanguine about mental health 
courts, [but] . . . thoroughly repudiat[ing] drug courts, calling for their abolition”). 
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make it less likely that the person with mental disabilities will suffer at the 
hands of others because of that status.126  As Steven Berenson noted, “veter-
ans receive not a ‘special treatment’ through veterans courts but the appro-
priate treatment that all defendants would receive through our criminal jus-
tice system in an ideal system.”127 
C. The Stereotype Perpetuation Argument 
“Critics also say that [v]eterans [c]ourts perpetuate the stereotype that 
veterans are returning ‘war-crazy.’”128  In responding to this argument, Pro-
fessor Steven Berenson concludes that “the burden should seem to be on 
veterans’ advocates better to publicize the successes of returning veterans 
than to deny necessary assistance to veterans who have not enjoyed any such 
successes.”129  While I agree that such publicity would be helpful, it seems to 
me that the issue here is much deeper, and reflects the malignancy of 
sanism—“an irrational prejudice . . . of the same quality and character of 
other [irrational prejudices that cause and are reflected in] prevailing [social 
attitudes of] racism, sexism, [homophobia], and ethnic bigotry”130—and its 
impact on all of society.131  General Patton’s famous slap132 was a perfect 
exemplar of the ravages of sanism.133  If anything, the existence of veterans 
courts—premised on the acknowledged reality that persons with mental dis-
abilities are victimized by prejudice and discrimination—will serve as a way 
of, eventually, remediating some of the stereotypes that exist about crazy 
soldiers returning home from war.134  Almost thirty years ago, this issue was 
raised in the specific context of Vietnam veterans charged with crimes that 
appeared related to diagnoses of PTSD:  “[L]awyers on both sides do fear 
  
 126. See PERLIN, “THERE ARE NO TRIALS INSIDE THE GATES OF EDEN,” supra note 14, at 
202–06.  On issues of fairness and procedural justice in hearings before such courts, see Terry 
Carney et al., Mental Health Tribunals:  “TJ” Implications of Weighing Fairness, Freedom, 
Protection and Treatment, 17 J. JUD. ADMIN. 46, 53–54 (2007); Risdon N. Slate, From the 
Jailhouse to Capitol Hill:  Impacting Mental Health Court Legislation and Defining What 
Constitutes a Mental Health Court, 49 CRIME & DELINQ. 6, 12, 15–16 (2003). 
 127. Berenson, supra note 16, at 40. 
 128. Hartsfield, supra note 18, at 860. 
 129. Berenson, supra note 16, at 41. 
 130. See Michael L. Perlin, On “Sanism,” 46 SMU L. REV. 373, 374 (1992). 
 131. See Perlin, “And My Best Friend, My Doctor/Won’t Even Say What It Is I’ve Got,” 
supra note 32, at 750; Perlin, “Everybody Is Making Love/or Else Expecting Rain,” supra 
note 32, at 502; Perlin, “You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks,” supra note 32, at 688. 
 132. See McCarthy, supra note 76, at 477–78. 
 133. See id.; see also Peter Blanck, “The Right to Live in the World”:  Disability Yester-
day, Today, and Tomorrow, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 367, 377 (2008). 
 134. See Blanck, supra note 133, at 377; Hartsfield, supra note 18, at 860–61. 
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that P-TDS [sic] cases could become litmus tests of attitudes about the war 
and the warriors.  Veterans often assume civilians will not understand their 
experiences, and jurors may worry that a guilty verdict proves they are un-
grateful to the soldiers.”135  Professor Peter Blanck has noted that “veterans 
with [PTSD] and mental conditions are among those with the highest war-
related injuries and most stigmatized impairments.”136  Elsewhere, I have 
described the roots of stigma facing persons with mental disabilities as being 
based on sanism, through which “‘able-bodied society feels existential anxie-
ty towards people with [mental] disabilities, and that anxiety’s at the core of . 
. . irrational prejudices that cause and are reflected in prevailing social atti-
tudes.’”137  If anything, veterans courts will diminish the stigma faced by 
such veterans and will help reduce the sanism prevalent in our treatment of 
them. 
D. The Costs Argument 
“Veterans [c]ourts have been criticized for being more costly than tradi-
tional courts.”138  My response here is a demurrer.  So what?  Like all prob-
lem-solving courts, these “courts offer a much wider range of services than 
their traditional counterparts, [and thus] tend to be more expensive than tra-
ditional courts” in terms of court operations.139  “However, the financial cost 
of problem-solving courts is still [significantly] less than the financial costs 
of incarceration and recidivism.”140  I think that Cathy Ho Hartsfield is pre-
cisely right when she concludes, on this point, “[p]roblem-solving courts, 
such as [v]eterans [c]ourts, should be viewed as a long-term solution, and 
thus, the long-term cost-efficient benefits are well worth the initial invest-
ment.”141 
  
 135. Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, The “Vietnam Syndrome” Defense:  A “G.I. Bill of Criminal 
Rights?,” ARMY LAW., Feb. 1985, at 1, 26 & n.171. 
 136. Blanck, supra note 133, at 377. 
 137. Id. (alteration in original); see also Michael L. Perlin, “Through the Wild Cathedral 
Evening”:  Barriers, Attitudes, Participatory Democracy, Professor tenBroek, and the Rights 
of Persons with Mental Disabilities, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 413, 416 (2008) (discussing Har-
lan Hahn, Toward a Politics of Disability:  Definitions, Disciplines, and Policies, INDEP. 
LIVING INST., para. 24 (1985), http://www.independentliving.org/docs4/hahn2.html); Michael 
Ashley Stein, Disability, Employment Policy, and the Supreme Court, 55 STAN. L. REV. 607, 
631–32 (2002) (book review); Harlan Hahn, Civil Rights for Disabled Americans:  The Foun-
dation of a Political Agenda, in IMAGES OF THE DISABLED, DISABLING IMAGES 181, 182 (Alan 
Gartner & Tom Joe eds., 1987). 
 138. Hartsfield, supra note 18, at 860. 
 139. Berenson, supra note 16, at 40. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Hartsfield, supra note 18, at 862. 
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E. The Domestic Violence Critique 
Advocates for victims of domestic violence have opposed including 
such offenses within the ambit of veterans courts at all, “noting the escalating 
nature of those offenses.”142  Pamela Kravetz has argued that all such cases 
should be excluded from the courts’ jurisdictional ambit, arguing that their 
inclusion “makes difficult and highly volatile situations even worse due to 
mixed messages about criminal responsibility, emphasis on treatment, and 
the risk of victim coercion.”143  Although this is an argument with surface 
appeal, I believe it fails as well.  In a discussion of problem-solving courts, 
Professor David Wexler and Judge Michael King have noted how, “for rea-
sons of political acceptability,” those charged with serious offenses are typi-
cally excluded from newly-created drug and mental health courts,144 but that, 
as time goes on, offenders charged with violent offenses are more likely to 
be accepted into these courts, and that offenders charged with domestic vio-
lence are now being included in some mental health courts, as long as the 
victim consents.145 
If the purpose of these courts is to “help struggling veterans [more] than 
the traditional criminal justice alternatives of conviction and incarcera-
tion,”146 then it makes no logical sense to exclude certain crimes from their 
jurisdictional ambit, especially crimes that, logically, may often be a mani-
festation of the PTSD with which eligible veterans have been diagnosed.147  
And of course, there are currently domestic violence problem-solving courts 
in many jurisdictions, many of which were begun in recognition of the reality 
that “traditional approaches have failed in addressing the underlying prob-
lems in areas such as . . . domestic violence.”148 
  
 142. Hawkins, supra note 59, at 570. 
 143. Kravetz, supra note 69, at 201. 
 144. David B. Wexler & Michael S. King, Promoting Societal and Juridical Receptivity to 
Rehabilitation:  The Role of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in COURT SUPERVISED TREATMENT 
ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION FOR DRUG-DEPENDENT OFFENDERS:  THE DRUG POLICY 
AGENDA (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1, 5), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1722278.  I 
discuss this phenomenon in PERLIN, “THERE ARE NO TRIALS INSIDE THE GATES OF EDEN,” 
supra note 14, at 206. 
 145. Wexler & King, supra note 144 (manuscript at 5 n.17). 
 146. Berenson, supra note 16, at 39. 
 147. See Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilitative Ethic in Military Justice, supra note 72, 
at 6, 7 & n.9. 
 148. Erin McGrath, Note, Reentry Courts:  Providing a Second Chance for Incarcerated 
Mothers and Their Children, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 113, 118 (2012). 
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F. The “Cherry Picking” Argument 
Other opponents accuse such courts of “cherry picking” low-risk candi-
dates, leaving potentially higher-risk offenders behind to be sentenced 
through the traditional criminal justice system.149  Other critics argue that the 
creation of such courts would disproportionately divert resources from other 
criminal courts “because judges already have the ability to take service-
connected disabilities like PTSD into consideration in all aspects of the crim-
inal justice system, including sentencing.”150 
The literature that raises these arguments, however, does not point out 
any evidence that this has actually happened.151  And while this certainly may 
happen in cases where courts have the discretion to accept violent offenders, 
it does not seem to be an appropriate concern with regard to the vast majority 
of courts that jurisdictionally only serve nonviolent offenders.  Also, in some 
jurisdictions, any individual charged with a statutorily-listed offense who is a 
veteran under federal law may opt in.152  And, I have an additional response 
here:  Our correctional system is broken, badly broken, and perhaps beyond 
repair, especially in cases of persons with serious mental disabilities who 
have been convicted of crime.153  Any alternative to the system that diverts 
anyone out (and into potentially redemptive treatment programs) is a good 
alternative.  This point has been made most effectively by legal journalist 
Dahlia Lithwick: 
But the fact that veterans courts seem to work as well as they do 
suggests a more fundamental lesson about correcting what’s bro-
ken in the criminal justice system.  Whether we really want to go 
down the road of creating first- and second-class criminal court 
systems and whether we can truly draw any principled line be-
tween special judicial treatment for nonviolent veterans but not the 
violent ones are not easy political questions.  They are thorny legal 
  
 149. Caine, supra note 60, at 235–36. 
 150. Hawkins, supra note 59, at 571. 
 151. See Caine, supra note 60, at 236; Hawkins, supra note 59, at 571. 
 152. Smith, supra note 18, at 99 & n.32 (discussing court in Anchorage, Alaska). 
 153. See MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HENRY A. DLUGACZ, MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES IN JAILS AND 
PRISONS:  CASES AND MATERIALS 3–4 (2008) [hereinafter PERLIN & DLUGACZ, MENTAL 
HEALTH ISSUES IN JAILS AND PRISONS]; John J. Gibbons & Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, Con-
fronting Confinement:  A Report of The Commission on Safety and Abuse in America’s Pris-
ons, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 385, 402 (2006) (“[M]ost correctional systems are set up to 
fail.”).  John J. Gibbons is a retired Third Circuit Court of Appeals Judge; . Nicholas de B. 
Katzenbach was the former Attorney General of the United States. 
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ones.  You don’t have to oppose veterans’ court to want that type 
of justice for all.154 
G. The “We Have Other Courts” Argument 
“Because drug and mental health treatment courts already exist in many 
jurisdictions, a common suggestion is to simply divert veterans into those 
programs rather than create a new category of treatment courts entirely.”155  
Tiffany Cartwright responds ably to this critique: 
[F]or combat veterans, their underlying problem is not their sub-
stance abuse, or even their PTSD—it is their combat trauma, and 
that is something that cannot be addressed as effectively in a tradi-
tional drug or mental health court.  Many veterans have experi-
enced things that are uncommon or unheard of among civilian de-
fendants.156 
H. The “Already Lenient” Argument 
Some “believe that veteran courts are unnecessary due to the already 
present leniency towards veterans in the court process.”157  There is little 
hard non-anecdotal evidence, however, that this actually happens, notwith-
standing the Supreme Court’s dicta in Porter v. McCollum,158 discussed ear-
lier in this paper.159  An amendment to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines has 
made federal sentencing more hospitable to PTSD claims by military veter-
ans, noting that military service may be an appropriate mitigating factor “in 
determining whether a departure is warranted, if the military service, indi-
vidually or in combination with other offender characteristics, is present to 
an unusual degree and distinguishes the case from the typical cases covered 
by the guidelines,”160 yet a recent search has revealed that there are few re-
  
 154. Lithwick, supra note 71. 
 155. Tiffany Cartwright, “To Care for Him Who Shall Have Borne the Battle”:  The Re-
cent Development of Veterans Treatment Courts in America, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 295, 
302–03 (2011). 
 156. Id. at 303 (footnotes omitted). 
 157. Walls, supra note 56, at 721. 
 158. 558 U.S. 30 (2009) (per curiam). 
 159. See supra text accompanying notes 95–98.  “Our Nation has a long tradition of ac-
cording leniency to veterans in recognition of their service, especially for those who fought on 
the front lines as Porter did.”  Porter, 558 U.S. at 43. 
 160. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.11 (2011); see also Grey, supra note 
86, at 70. 
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ported cases interpreting this provision.161  And, of course, not all states use 
guidelines modeled on the federal law.162 
Mental health defenses based upon PTSD are typically unsuccessful, 
and even where mitigation is deemed warranted, the veteran-defendant will 
still face incarceration—often lengthy incarceration.163  And, if incarcerated, 
it is likely that this cohort will not receive the necessary psychological treat-
ment.164  The leniency argument is not reality-based. 
In short, none of the arguments offered in opposition to the creation of 
these courts is persuasive. 
VI. COUNSEL AND JUDICIARY ISSUES 
There has been little commentary on the question of the quality of coun-
sel made available to defendants in veterans court proceedings.  I believe, 
though, that consideration of counsel effectiveness in other problem-solving 
court venues may be relevant to this discussion.  We know that the quality of 
counsel made available to criminal defendants with mental disabilities is 
often tragically substandard.165  At least one court has ruled, by way of ex-
ample, that failure of counsel to pursue a PTSD defense did not deny effec-
tive assistance of counsel, characterizing Vietnam stress syndrome as a novel 
defense which need not be explored by counsel.166  Others have rejected 
Strickland v. Washington167 based arguments168 where PTSD was not raised 
  
 161. Grey, supra note 86, at 70 & n.80. 
 162. See, e.g., Caine, supra note 60, at 230–31; see also Grey, supra note 86, at 69, 70. 
 163. See supra text accompanying notes 87–98; see also Michael L. Perlin & Henry A. 
Dlugacz, “It’s Doom Alone That Counts”:  Can International Human Rights Law Be an Effec-
tive Source of Rights in Correctional Conditions Litigation?, 27 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 675, 676, 
680–81 (2009) [hereinafter Perlin & Dlugacz, “It’s Doom Alone That Counts”]; PERLIN & 
DLUGACZ, MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES IN JAILS AND PRISONS, supra note 153, at 3. 
 164. Perlin & Dlugacz, “It’s Doom Alone That Counts,” supra note 163, at 681. 
 165. See MICHAEL L. PERLIN, A PRESCRIPTION FOR DIGNITY:  RETHINKING CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE AND MENTAL DISABILITY LAW (2013); see also Michael L. Perlin, “The Executioner’s 
Face Is Always Well-Hidden”:  The Role of Counsel and the Courts in Determining Who 
Dies, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 201, 202–05, 207 (1996-1997); MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL 
DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY:  THE SHAME OF THE STATES 126 (2013) [hereinafter 
PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY]. 
 166. See Miller v. State, 338 N.W.2d 673, 678 (S.D. 1983).  But see id. at 682 (Henderson, 
J., dissenting). 
 167. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 168. Id. at 686 (test for adequacy is “whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper 
function[] of the adversarial process that the trial [court] cannot be relied on as having pro-
duced a just result”).  I discuss Strickland extensively in PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE 
DEATH PENALTY, supra note 165, at 129–31. 
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at the sentencing phase of death penalty trials.169  Although there is some 
evidence that, at the current time, more defendants have successfully used 
PTSD defenses in sentence mitigation efforts,170 there is no evidence that the 
criminal defense bar, in the aggregate, gets the full meaning and potential 
range of PTSD defenses.171  At the very least, such lawyers must begin to 
“apprise themselves of their clients’ military experience and mental health 
background so as to protect and best advocate for the best interests of their 
clients.”172 
How can we be confident that counsel will be adequate in cases involv-
ing similar issues before veterans courts when much less is at stake (than in 
the death penalty context)?  Dr. Steven Erickson and his colleagues have 
expressed “concern[] as to whether defendants in mental health courts re-
ceive adequate representation by their attorneys.”173  Terry Carney character-
izes the assumption that adequate counsel will be present at hearings to guar-
antee liberty values as a “false hope.”174 
Henry Dlugacz and Christopher Wimmer summarize the salient issues: 
 It is not reasonable to expect a client to repose trust in an 
attorney unless she is confident that he is acting in accordance with 
her wishes.  The client with mental illness may already doubt the 
  
 169. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Thaler, 389 F. App’x 419, 421, 425, 429, 432 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(per curiam), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2445 (2011) (holding that defense counsel’s failures to 
investigate and present evidence of petitioner’s PTSD, attention deficit disorder, drug addic-
tion, fetal alcohol syndrome, learning disabilities, and borderline I.Q. did not prejudice him); 
Jordan v. Epps, 740 F. Supp. 2d 802, 814, 853–56 (S.D. Miss. 2010) (finding that determina-
tion that petitioner was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to obtain mental health exam-
iner in capital murder prosecution was not contrary to, nor unreasonable application of, clearly 
established federal law; there was no connection between petitioner’s alleged PTSD from his 
military service and his criminal behavior that would have required evaluation by mental 
health examiner). 
 170. Nidiffer & Leach, supra note 100, at 16. 
 171. See Daniel Burgess et al., Reviving the “Vietnam Defense”:  Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder and Criminal Responsibility in a Post-Iraq/Afghanistan World, DEV. MENTAL 
HEALTH L., Jan. 2010, at 59, 77–78 (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Porter v. 
McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 43 (2009) (per curiam), stating that “such a ruling places a burden on 
the defense bar to ascertain clients’ military background and subsequent related issues when 
defending them in capital cases.”). 
 172. Id. at 79. 
 173. Steven K. Erickson et al., Variations in Mental Health Courts:  Challenges, Oppor-
tunities, and a Call for Caution, 42 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 335, 340 (2006). 
 174. Terry Carney, The Mental Health Service Crisis of Neoliberalism—An Antipodean 
Perspective, 31 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 101, 105 (2008); see also Terry Carney, Best Inter-
ests or Legal Rectitude?:  Australian Mental Health Tribunal Stakeholder & Case-Flow Impli-
cations 33 (Nov. 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.mhcirl.ie/Training_ 
Development/Professor_Terry_Carney_Best_Interests_or_Legal_Rectitude_Paper.pdf (“The 
issue of legal advocacy before [mental health tribunals] . . . is a vexed one.”). 
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attorney’s loyalty.  This risk is exacerbated when the attorney is 
appointed by the court.  The client may wonder whether the attor-
ney has been assigned in order to zealously represent her, or in-
stead to facilitate her processing through the legal system. . . . 
There are . . . strong personal disincentives to thorough prepara-
tion, even for the committed attorney. . . . There are also institu-
tional pressures:  The attorney who depends on the goodwill of 
others in the system (e.g., judges, state attorneys, or prosecutors) 
may pull his punches, even unwittingly, in order to retain credibil-
ity for future interactions (which he would put to use for his future 
clients).  Judges want cases resolved.175 
 
Some solutions—largely drawing upon TJ imperatives176—have been 
offered.  Bruce Winick has argued that “lawyers should adequately counsel 
their clients about the advantages and disadvantages of accepting diversion 
to mental health court.”177  “As a result, judges and defense counsel in mental 
health courts should ensure that defendants receive dignity and respect, [and] 
are given a sense of voice and validation.”178  Further, it is essential that 
counsel has “a background in mental health issues and in communicating 
with individuals who may be in crisis.”179  Tiffany Cartwright has even rec-
ommended that “the prosecutor and defense counsel should work together 
using a non-adversarial approach to protect both public safety and the veter-
an’s rights.”180 
  
 175. Henry Dlugacz & Christopher Wimmer, The Ethics of Representing Clients with 
Limited Competency in Guardianship Proceedings, 4 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 331, 
353–54 (2011).  On the need for lawyers taking a TJ approach to view their clients holistical-
ly, see Wexler & King, supra note 144. 
 176. See Deen Potter, Lawyer, Social Worker, Psychologist and More:  The Role of the 
Defence Lawyer in Therapeutic Jurisprudence, AM. U. SCH. PUB. AFF., 96–97 (Jan. 2005), 
www1.spa.american.edu/justice/documents/105/pdf. (on the challenges inherent in a therapeu-
tic jurisprudence practice).  On how the use of TJ can improve public defender practices in 
general, see Clarke & Neuhard, supra note 51, at 786–800, 803–04. 
 177. Susan Stefan & Bruce J. Winick, A Dialogue on Mental Health Courts, 11 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 507, 523 (2005). 
 178. Id. at 516. 
 179. Tammy Seltzer, Mental Health Courts:  A Misguided Attempt to Address the Crimi-
nal Justice System’s Unfair Treatment of People with Mental Illnesses, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 570, 576 (2005); see also M. Carmela Epright, Coercing Future Freedom:  Con-
sent and Capacities for Autonomous Choice, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 799, 801 (2010) (“‘Ideal-
ly, in mental health courts all courtroom personnel—i.e., judge, prosecutor, defense counsel 
and other relevant professionals—have experience and training in mental health issues and 
available community resources.’”). 
 180. Cartwright, supra note 155, at 307.  Her suggestion appears to track, sub silentio, 
much of the restorative justice literature that urges solutions by which to “restore victims, 
restore offenders, and restore communities in a way that all stakeholders can agree is just.”  
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What about the role of judges?  Judge Michael King has written elo-
quently about the need for judges to become experts in the interpersonal as-
pects of judging, noting that, depending on the circumstances, judging may 
require “particular listening and communication skills, the expression of em-
pathy, the use of techniques of persuasion or motivational interviewing, the 
use of techniques to settle child witnesses and collaborative problem-solving 
techniques.”181  Certainly, the need for these skills is intensified in problem-
solving courts, such as veterans courts.182 
VII. CONCLUSION 
I began by quoting Judge Ackerman’s decision in the Falter case that 
the litigation there was about how the plaintiffs—VA residents—“are treated 
as human beings.”183  Writing recently about the role of the judiciary in prob-
lem-solving courts in general, Australian Judge Michael S. King quoted a 
judge involved in the creation of the first drug court in Miami, Florida, as 
referring to his work as “a statement of our belief in the redemption of hu-
man beings.”184  I believe this is where we must start. 
David Wexler and Judge King set out an important list of key TJ strate-
gies that all problem-solving courts should incorporate:185 
  
Id.; John Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment Is Marginalized:  Realistic or Utopian?, 
46 UCLA L. REV. 1727, 1743 (1999); see also JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & 
RESPONSIVE REGULATION 11 (2002) (“‘Restorative justice is a process whereby all the parties 
with a stake in [the] . . . offence come together to resolve collectively how to deal with the 
aftermath of the offence and its implications for the future.’”). 
 181. Michael King, Realising the Potential of Judging, 37 MONASH U. L. REV. 171, 171–
72 (2011) [hereinafter King, Realising the Potential of Judging]. 
 182. See id. at 176; Michael S. King, New Directions in the Courts’ Response to Drug and 
Alcohol Related Legal Problems:  Interdisciplinary Collaboration 2 (2012) (unpublished man-
uscript) [hereinafter King, New Directions], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2130343; 
see also Astrid Birgden & Michael L. Perlin, ‘Tolling for the Luckless, the Abandoned and 
Forsaked’:  Therapeutic Jurisprudence and International Human Rights Law as Applied to 
Prisoners and Detainees by Forensic Psychologists, 13 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 
231, 234 (2008); Astrid Birgden & Michael L. Perlin, “Where the Home in the Valley Meets 
the Damp Dirty Prison”:  A Human Rights Perspective on Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the 
Role of Forensic Psychologists in Correctional Settings, 14 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 
256, 257 (2009); Perlin, “Baby, Look Inside Your Mirror,” supra note 32, at 606; Perlin, 
“Striking for the Guardians and Protectors of the Mind,” supra note 29, at 1184; PERLIN, 
UNDERSTANDING THE INTERSECTION, supra note 29, at 200–02. 
 183. Falter I, 502 F. Supp. 1178, 1185 (D.N.J. 1980). 
 184. King, New Directions, supra note 182, at 17–18. 
 185. Wexler & King, supra note 144 (manuscript at 12–15).  Judge King prefers “solution-
focused courts” to “problem-solving courts” as the proper descriptor.  Id. at 12; see also King, 
New Directions, supra note 182, at 17. 
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Promoting participant choice wherever possible. 
Asking participants to formulate rehabilitation plans setting 
out their goals for their time in the program and beyond and the 
strategies they intend to pursue in order to achieve these goals. 
Including participants’ rehabilitation plans as part of behav-
ioral contracts. 
Having positive (but realistic) expectations concerning partic-
ipant achievement. 
Promoting self-efficacy.  Self-efficacy refers to a person’s be-
lief in his or her ability to function competently. 
As far as possible avoiding a coercive and/or paternalistic ap-
proach to addressing problems with participants’ performance 
while engaging in the DTC program. 
The use of non-confrontational methods of engagement with 
participants in order to promote behavioral change—such as moti-
vational interviewing techniques and persuasion.186 
These prescriptions strike me as a perfect starting place at which veter-
ans court judges should begin.  In a recent article on the potential of judging, 
Judge King concludes by noting: 
The interpersonal dimension of judging has received particular 
note through the exercise of facilitative, change-oriented and in-
clusive judging practices in problem-solving courts and in the use 
of therapeutic jurisprudence in other contexts.  It has also been ex-
emplified in the acknowledgment within the judiciary of the neces-
sity to be more aware of and sensitive to the needs of individuals 
from diverse backgrounds, who come before the court in various 
capacities.187 
This sort of awareness is absolutely crucial if veterans courts are, in fact, 
going to succeed and if they can ameliorate the transition of returning veter-
ans into civil society.188  And it is an awareness that needs to be undertaken, 
  
 186. Wexler & King, supra note 144 (manuscript at 12–15). 
 187. King, Realising the Potential of Judging, supra note 181, at 186. 
 188. See Hawkins, supra note 59, at 570–72. 
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in the words of Judge Michael Daly Hawkins, a Ninth Circuit federal judge, 
“with an understanding heart, a firm hand, and a watchful eye.”189 
In Dylan’s song John Brown, upon return from the war, the eponymous 
narrator tells his mother: 
“And I couldn’t help but think, through the thunder rolling and 
stink. That I was just a puppet in a play 
And through the roar and smoke, this string is finally broke 
And a cannonball blew my eyes away.”190 
The extent to which our returning servicemen and servicewomen have 
been puppets in a play is a question that will be debated for decades, at least.  
As Dahlia Lithwick has perceptively noted, “[v]eterans return from war hav-
ing seen and survived unspeakable things, then try to adjust to civilian life 
with inadequate resources and support.”191  The very least we can do is to 
acknowledge what they have faced, the impact that their experiences at war 
have had, and restructure the judicial system to provide at least some of the 
needed resources and support. 
  
 189. Id. at 563 n.*, 572. 
 190. DYLAN, supra note 23. 
 191. Lithwick, supra note 71. 
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